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Purpose: Healthmanagers, administrators and health practitioners now face new challenges
due to the increasing dependency being placed on electronic health information systems.
This paper focuses on Electronic Health Records for determining the critical attributes for
e-health system development. The proposed QUiPS model aims to provide a framework for
building trustworthy solutions by identifying the pertinent issues needed to determine the
risk exposure with a given system.
Approach: To produce dependable, low risk and viable IT solutions, each critical attribute
needs to be specifically addressed and prioritized. It is shown how these attributes possess
a number of interdependencies making the analysis and prioritization tasks complex and
hence, in practice, often incomplete. Two Australian case studies are presented that access
enterprise level applications of live health records where these risk based techniques have
been applied.
Results: The value and the shortcomings of taking a risk based approach to developing and
deploying electronic health information systems that are safe and secure, is evaluated. The
case studies presented indicate that traditional methods used to derive the requirements
are often inadequate and the risks that are faced in ensuring a safe and secure system are
highly application dependent and dynamic.
Conclusions: onvergence towards aviableuniversal solution for our electronichealth recordsEis not imminent and trust in e-health is fragile. Policies that data custodians follow needto be flexible and updated on a regular basis. Technological solutions are at best a stop
gap to avoid the common hazards associated with access control and secure messaging.
A wider range of analysis techniques to determine the key issues for a dependable health
information system can derive longer term sustainable solutions.
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. Introduction
ealth care within Australia is a complex mix of private,
ublic, state and federal provision. The need for continued
nvestment in e-health is evident with the necessity to move
rom what has been a highly manual, diverse and widely
but the increased use of electronic records introduces new
risks, particularly from the remoteness and speed of access
that is now achievable. Appropriate use of technology can,
for example, reduce the risks of incidences associated with
common security weakness. Approaches to IT security is well
understood, e.g. the Common Criteria [1]; plus its applicationUN
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istributed collection of health data to standardized, highly
vailable and connected electronic record systems. To date,
ost data has been collected and stored as manual records
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risk exposure in e-health systems, Int. J. Med. Inform. (2006),
to secure e-health is well researched [2–4]; which now has to 16
take into account the recent legislative constraints, e.g. HIPAA 17
[5]. Whatever methods are used, e.g. CORAS, CRAMM [6], the
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software products must operate in a particular environment
with particular external impacts resulting in a unique set of
interconnected hazards and problems.
With the increased push toward national health data inte-
gration in Australia, e.g. Health Connect [7] and the problems
of differing state and organizational policies any risks are far
from static. For example, the National e-Health Transition
Authority notes that privacy protection in Australia is a com-
plex patchwork. “NEHTA’s position has been to chart health
privacy requirements within the privacy environment that we
have now. It is considered possible to navigate the existing pri-
vacy environment although this is not without some risk and
may require future changes.” [8]. Hence, any policies that our
data custodians follow need to be highly flexible and reviewed
on a regular basis.
Health data can be used for many different purposes.
This paper considers two case studies, one concerned with
the implementation of community health information man-
agement, including clinical records, and the other with the
integration of various existing databases of patient’s records
to allow researchers to perform population based studies.
Currently in Australia, this secondary use of data, in some cir-
cumstances, is explicitly permitted but is often viewed as a
legal and ethical minefield. However, for medical researchers
and health service providers it provides valuable information
on things such as cause of the disease and best treatments
or the patient journey and disease clusters. In order that
research can continue to inform and improve Australians’
health while complying with the Privacy Act [9], the National
Health and Medical Research Council [10] has issued guide-
lines approved by the Privacy Commissioner. Although this
provides health researchers valuable access to data without
patient consent, there are risks associated with the trust that
individuals and data custodians have in keeping such data
securely de-identified.
This paper considers the question of how application or
organisationally dependent these risks are and, therefore, to
what degree any risk management should be customised to
suit. The case studies presented show that a risk based secu-
rity analysis alone will not adequately address some of the
key issues affecting trust and successful deployment. That is,
different critical attributes have been identified in addition
to security, that require their own evaluation methods and
yet each attribute has an effect on the risks being addressed.
The examples given emphasise that these attributes are not
independent. This paper will, therefore, evaluate the benefit
of using a risk based method that systematically investigates
interdependencies between critical attributes. The key results
from the case studies are presented, from which the need for
further research is discussed.
2. The QUiPS model
The quality of a software product is an insufficient determi-
nant to establish if it can be considered legally safe and secure.U
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That is, a product may provide excellent reliability yet not
have any features to protect from the particular hazards that
a given working environment presents. This is well known in
the safety-critical community whereby system-wide analysis P
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to include the operational andmanagement aspects are incor-
porated into any hazard analysis. Security specialists are also
aware of this requirement, although fromour case study expe-
riences it is evident awide range of knowledge and capabilities
are to be foundwithin theAustralian health industrieswhen it
comes to deploying effective IT security and safety measures,
compounded by the patchwork of legislative requirements.
The QUiPS model [11] aims to provide a set of related
methods that address the most pertinent issues facing the
successful deployment of today’s electronic health systems.
The model has been derived based on the experience of sev-
eral research projects and consultancies using real e-health
case studies undertaken by the authors [12–14]. The QUiPS
model is based on the investigation of four critical attributes,
namely Quality, Usability, Privacy and Safety. Other IT appli-
cations might prioritize things differently. In the software
games industry, for example, Performance is a high priority
whereas Safety would not normally be taken into consider-
ation. Balancing such constraints, many of which conflict, is
standard practice with software engineers. The QUiPS model
provides a framework from which the interdependencies of
these attributes can be assessed.
Code Attribute At risk
Q Quality i. Not developing the right product
(i.e. not meeting requirements)
ii. Not developing a robust product
(i.e. not well engineered)
U Usability i. Degree of usage (i.e. full or partial
use of functions)
ii. Acceptance by users (e.g.
clinicians, patients, administrators)
P Privacy i. System security (i.e. preventing
unauthorised access)
ii. Patient confidentiality (e.g. not
revealing personal health data)
S Safety i. Harm to the system (e.g.
availability, data corruption)
ii. Harm to people (e.g. medical
errors, medical data integrity)
For example, with Emergency Services poor IT usability
could present a high risk. A risk based hazard or incident anal-
ysis would not determine the usability of a system for which
a separate and specific evaluation is required. QUiPS provides
a wider framework for investigating the attributes their social
and technical aspects and a systematic approach to handle
their interdependencies.
2.1. Case study—CHIME
CHIME is a Community Health Information ManagementIJB 2325 1–6
risk exposure in e-health systems, Int. J. Med. Inform. (2006),
Enterprise system implemented in New South Wales Health, 106
Australia [12]. It is an operational, clinical information system 107
that is designed to improve service delivery, outcome mea- 108
sures and productivity, through improved capture and man- 109
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gement of Community Based Health Service Information.
taff are able to do a variety of functions more easily includ-
ng accurate documentation of client assessment, develop
ndividualisedmanagement plans based on best practise prin-
iples, monitor outcomes of clinical care and generate reports
or client and management. CHIME was first implemented in
he Child Assessment Intervention Team (CAIT) in November
002 and then in the Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT) in
uly 2003. At the request of the CHIME management team the
uthors initially undertook ausability analysis [12,14] followed
y a safety analysis [13].
Usability Evaluation of CHIME began just before the imple-
entation at CAIT and continued with the implementation
t ACAT. The clinicians in CAIT and ACAT practise a wide
ariety of health services ranging from psychologists, speech
athologists, audiologists, occupational therapists, physio-
herapists, dementia specialists and nurse clinicians. There
ere 21 clinicians from CAIT and 9 clinicians from ACAT
ho took part in this research. The approach taken involved
variety of methods, including semi-structured interviews,
uestionnaires and recording of actual usage on the system
sing Camtasia software for voice and screen capture. This
as conducted at several stages of the implementation; before
HIME was implemented, after the clinicians were trained
nd after 3 months’ usage. The three attributes of usability,
.e. efficiency, effectiveness and satisfaction, were evaluated by
ollecting usability metrics. An expert heuristic evaluation of
HIME’s usability involving 372 questionswas also carried out.
euristic evaluation involves having a small set of evaluators
xamine the interface and judge its compliance with recog-
ized usability principles (the heuristics). These heuristics
efer to various aspects of a system, ranging from its visibility,
rror prevention, design, and user interaction.
The safety analysis was conducted after the system imple-
entation. This involved a team of experts from the CHIME
anagement team, health and safety officials and clinical
xperts in management positions. A fault tree of all prior and
erceived incidences were charted against which estimates of
ikelihood of occurrences was incorporated.
.2. Case study—health data integration
ithin the Australian’s Commonwealth research agency
CSIRO) integration of health data is being supported byU
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DITM [15]. This is a powerful software tool that underpins
he linkage of critical information across disparate database
ources. It is used by the CSIRO’s Preventative Health (p-
ealth) Flagship program [16] involving over 100 researchers P
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undertaking 20 related projects. The primary goal is to
improve our knowledge in the area of preventative health to
save $2 billion in direct costs in Australian health care provi-
sion for chronic diseases. HDITM has the capacity to provide
unique insight into possible causes and effective prevention
methods through extensive population studies of collected
health data. This data is dispersed across several data bases
withmany custodians responsible for its integrity and privacy.
Note this data is located in several states each with their
own legal requirements relating to data handling sharing and
security to meet their own individual interpretation of the
National privacy legislation.
The architecture of HDITM is being developed to provide
state-of-the-art in robust security technology and flexible
access control mechanisms. This has to be coupled with the
privacy requirements to limit the movement and access of
identifiable data yet at the same time permit matching of
records to facilitate research. In thehandling of sensitive infor-
mation, Trust is a critical factor that can take years to build and
a moment to break. The successful outcome of HDITM and p-
Health relies on building and maintaining such trust against
a backdrop of shifting policies on data protection.
3. Applying QUiPS to evaluate e-health
safety and security
3.1. Interdependencies with CHIME
One of the powerful features of the QUiPSmodel is in the iden-
tification of interdependencies between the critical attributes.
Having identified some of the root causes that could lead to
a safety incident, what roles do the usability and privacy of
the system play in this? For example, from one of the identi-
fied hazards where the ‘clinician visits without security personnel
or support’ [13], it can be seen how both privacy and usability
issues that arise directly from the introduction of IT systems,
could compromise safety, as follows:
From the usability evaluations, CHIME was considered
highly usable [12]. That is both from the system design per-
spective and from some of the end-user’s perspective. Not all
users accepted the system and this had an effect on their per-
ception of CHIME’s usability. No matter what you do some
users will determine that a system is totally unusable and
non productive for cultural and political reasons, as evidentIJB 2325 1–6
risk exposure in e-health systems, Int. J. Med. Inform. (2006),
in [12]. User acceptance is not one of the attributes associ- 196
atedwithusability (see above). TheQUiPSmodel helps identify 197
this shortcoming as a potential risk prompting the adoption 198
of acceptance testing using TAM [14]. As with any health 199
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information system incorrect use could put both patients and
clinicians at risk.
From the initial safety analysis [13] no high risk safety
issues were evident that came from the implementation of
an IT system. From the management’s perspective the main
safety concerns would come from ensuring all users are suf-
ficiently knowledgeable on the capabilities and content of
the CHIME system. Incorrect assumptions about the type and
use of data contained by CHIME could present a higher than
acceptable risk, for example, the completeness of information
about a patient who has been transferred from other clinics or
private hospitals. Users who become complacent are another
concern, for example, ignoring alerts or leaving livedata acces-
sible during training sessions. Privacy was paramount from
the management perspective but difficult to implement in a
widely acceptable manner. The analysis to date has shown
that all the critical characteristics had demonstrable interde-
pendencies. Using QUiPS ensured that the safety and security
can be minimised to acceptable levels without compromis-
ing the usability or privacy requirements, which is essential
for ensuring successful adoption of a system deployed in the
sensitive health care sector.
3.2. Consequences of health data integration
In consultation with the practitioners, a number of conse-
quences have been derived that could arise from incidents
occurring. Incidents may manifest in various ways, for exam-
ple, inappropriate publication of results, letters sent out to
the wrong people or media involvement with an alleged com-
plaint. The consequences from incidents arising include:
• data not being supplied by patients/custodians;
• patients offended and taking legal action;
• research projects rejected by ethics committees;
• screening and prevention programs halted;
• loss of reputation and/or income;
• medical knowledge not advanced;
• incorrect treatment administered;
• collapse of our health care provision (particularly in disaster
response situations).
For HDITM, our research is focusing is on providing, in addi-
tion to risk assessment, IT tools that assist in ascertaining
the end users’ knowledge, to check on their intended usage,
to map against Federal/State legislation and local policies,
to check on their ethics clearances and to enforce dead-
lines, audits and reviews. Our aim is to ensure such a pro-
cess is always undertaking before permitting access to the
data and data linkage tools. This will reassure the public,
media and management that: the risks have been assessed,
the probability of an incident has been estimated and ade-
quate security and protection mechanisms have been put
in place. U
Please cite this article in press as: P.R. Croll, J. Croll, Investigating
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3.3. The risks with HDITM
Integrating health data across a number of disparate
databases integration raises several questions:
302 P
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• What are the new risks that health data integration brings?
• What techniqueswould quantify andminimize these risks?
• Do the privacy guidelines and legislation help or hinder?
• Canwe realistically look at health care provision as awhole?
• What role does Trust play?
To address this, research undertaken with the Preventative
Health Flagship has looked at the risks from differing view-
points. That is, themanagement of data by thedata custodians
of the various health data bases across five states and the
patients themselves (as the source of data).
This study has identified that the main risks as seen by the
data custodians include:
• the accidental disclosure of individuals (M);
• contacting the wrong people, i.e. data records linking to the
wrong people or the wrong reasons (VH);
• the incorrect use of data or for the wrong project or purpose
(M→H);
• not having sufficient knowledge or control over their own
data, i.e. in hands of IT services or third party (M→H);
• other data custodians not providing them data for linkage
(H);
• not following the privacy principles and their local policies,
i.e. as determined by ethics committees (L→M).
Five custodians have been involved in the study to date.
The initial analysis shows the estimate of risk from low (L)
through medium (M) to high (H) with the second risk showing
as very high (VH) due to the incidences already experienced
in this category. The preliminary study, which was based on
interviews, will be expanded in 2006 for further detailed anal-
ysis of the two highest risk groups.
Whereas, this study has identified that the main risks as
perceived by the public include:
• abuse of genetic data (e.g. disclosure to insurance compa-
nies);
• release of sensitive information (e.g. sexual, mental health);
• government control of personal data (including concern
over using health identifiers as a national identity scheme
since IDs are not a current Australian requirement);
• use of data without an individual giving explicit consent
(primarily for research purposes);
• poor data integrity (information inaccurately recorded or
records mismatched);
• inadequate safeguards (any access by unauthorised people).
The source of the data for assessing the public’s percep-
tion has been mainly derived from the data custodians, the
practicing clinicians and other related reports, e.g. a nation-
wide telephone study with a total of 1507 adults, see [17].
The practitioners are in constant contact with the public who
have provided specific information on colorectal and lung can-
cer consisting of over 5000 patient records. Although many
of these risks are perceived rather than based on actual orIJB 2325 1–6
risk exposure in e-health systems, Int. J. Med. Inform. (2006),
even probable incidences, the QUiPS analysis to date has 303
highlighted how they could have a direct effect on the conse- 304
quences. This has prompted further research to accommodate 305
the perceived riskwhich is not adequately addressedwith cur- 306
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The result of this research has increased our knowledge
of some of the interdependencies and how a structured
method canbeused to identify themeffectively. A further
finding has been that the risks derived from calcula-
tion based on past incidences and prediction by experts
significantly deviates from the perceived risks associ-
ated with as our primary data source, i.e. the patients.
This is significant in that it indicates how we should
modify or expand our methods to accommodate these
perceived risks which are putting the opportunity to
undertake futuremedical research at high risk. This is an
area of national significance where preventative health
programs require knowledge for effective diagnostics,
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ent methods. That is, the current assumption that revised
ork practice and education can bring about effective change
o minimised such risks is unfounded in practice, see [18].
. Conclusions
ealth data spans across numerous databases and jurisdic-
ional boundaries. Hence, within Australia there is a need for
oint agreement on the business process utilised such that
ny technical solution adopted will need to be driven by these
rocesses and yet flexible enough to suit the differences at
rganizational, state and federal levels. Today’s technology
an provide a range of option for providing low risk solutions
n the adoption of electronic health records. The biggest risk
aced is in understanding the complex environments that our
ealth services present and ensuring the users appreciate and
omplywith any policies set. Numerous divergent approaches
ontinue to be researched aiming to provide practical, secure
nd compliant solutions that protect health data privacy. Con-
ergence towards a viable universal solution is not imminent
herefore trust in e-health is decidedly more fragile as com-
ared with many other industry sectors. Hence, any policies
hat data custodians follow need to be flexible and updated on
regular basis to allow for changes.
The case studies presented, althoughwithin the Australian
ontext, indicate that the methods used to derive the require-
ents are often inadequate. The risks that are faced in ensur-
ng a safe and secure systemarehighly applicationdependent.
urthermore, with the constant changes in system intercon-
ectivity against a backdrop of changes in legislation these
isks are high dynamic. It is evident that the current con-
entional approaches taken are incapable of determining or
acilitating an ongoing low risk solution. That is, from a secu-
ity perspective, the technological solutions are at best a stop
ap to avoid the common hazards associated with access
ontrol and secure messaging. A wider range of analysis tech-
iques to determine the key issues for a dependable health
nformation system, as presented in this paper, is proposed
s a more comprehensive method for deriving solutions that
re sustainable in the longer term.
Summary points
What has been learnt from this research?
Prior to undertaking this research the knowledge of the
risks associated with the use of electronic health data
was not sufficiently well understood within the context
of the applications for the case studies selected. Since
risk is a derivative of the consequences (that result from
failures) they are highly application dependent. Some
attributes of applications can be generalised permitting
effective protective measures from known hazards, for
example, the need to encrypt messages to reduce the
risks associatedwith interception. To rely entirely on this
approach can result in some significant high level risks
remaining, particularly when they relate to the specificU
Please cite this article in press as: P.R. Croll, J. Croll, Investigating
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usage and implementations. Furthermore, unforeseen
incidences are often associated with complex interde-
pendencies between competing features and functions.
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